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Abstract  
The paper is based on the findings of a major project by the Higher School of Economics Institute for 
Industrial and Market Studies (IIMS) to monitor competitiveness of  manufacturing enterprises. The 
study focuses on the drivers and dynamics of business competitiveness, including changes in firms’ 
behavior during the period before the crisis (2005-2008). The primary issue was to find out what firms 
and to what extent succeeded in capitalizing on the strong economic growth before the crisis to catch 
up with their competitors and gain a sustainable competitive position in the market. What was driving 
output increases and enhanced production efficiency? What were the impediments to this process?  
 
Key words: Manufacturing industry, Russia, economic crisis, competitiveness 
 
JEL classification: D21, L25, P23 
 
 
 
 
July 2010 
 2
 
Introduction 
It is quite a common notion both inside and outside the country that most of Russian 
manufacturing is based on the obsolete technologies, incompetitive, at least on the global 
markets, and has no future. We would argue that while there are acute problems with the 
development of this sescor there have been a lot of positive changes in recent years, in 
particular on the micro-level. And this gives some hope for revival of manufacturing. 
Manufacturing industry started to revive from transitional shock after 1998 crisis using the 
advantages of devaluated national currency, relatively cheap labor and  free production 
capacities. For several years this development was mostly extensive – based on growing 
internal demand and import substitution with little new investments and innovation. By the 
mid 2000s the most important sources for extensive development originating from the crisis 
of 1998 were largely depleted. It seemed imminent that Russian manufacturing firms would 
have to look for a different – intensive - development strategy, involving new market entry, 
technological upgrade and product innovation (World Bank 2007). It should be admitted 
today that those  expectations did not come quite true. In fact, in 2005-2008, an exceptionally 
favorable external environment and terms of trade, rapid expansion of domestic demand and 
improved access to borrowings helped most industrial enterprises to maintain their market 
power and, moreover, to increase output without any significant changes in their technologies, 
innovation risks or entering new, first of all, international markets. There were no 
revolutionary breakthrough, but on the macrolevel the share of manufacturing sectors in the 
national GDP stayed stable and there was relatively fast growth of labor productivity, mostly 
due to decrease of employment without the corresponding drop of production.  
This would not mean, however, that there were no progress at all. The overall smooth 
evolution was masking over a robust restructuring under way in individual firms that were 
changing their behaviors for more market-oriented, despite the underlying institutional 
arrangements that remained far from “ideal”. For better understanding the major trends inside 
the manufacturing one need to look not so much at macroeconomic data but at indicators of 
performance and behavior on micro-level. This paper  is not attempting to cover all the 
aspects of manufacturing firms behavior but concentrates mostly on answering several 
important questions. Were the pre-crisis years a time of efficient growth? Which firms 
enhanced competitiveness? What were the major changes in the behavior of firms in terms of 
innovation, management, state-business relations, etc.? These questions seem no less 
important both for an assessment of the current situation and for designing economic and 
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industrial policies to recover from the crisis. It should be noted that the data we use in our 
research is dated spring 2009 when the crisis has already hit the Russian economy badly. But  
it was before the consequences of the crises were fully realized. Thus, our findings mostly 
focus on the changes in pre-crisis period.   
The empirical base for this study is the data of  two rounds of the survey conducted in 
2005 and 2009. 1000 of medium and large firms in 8 sectors of manufacturing have been 
surveyed in each round and about 500 of firms has been surveyed twice providing a panel 
sample for comparisons of two years1.  
Manufacturing industries in 2005­2008:  
macroeconomic and institutional environment 
Right up to mid 2008, the manufacturing industries were developing in an exceedingly 
favorable economic environment. Domestic demand was expanding dramatically, external 
financing was getting more and more available as real interest rates on bank loans were 
decreasing to become even negative at times, foreign investment in Russia’s manufacturing 
was also building up. On the negative side during that period, manufacturing was adversely 
affected by persistently high inflation (albeit moderate compared to the previous period), 
REER appreciation and accelerated growth of labor costs.  
In this context, manufacturing successes look, on the one hand, unquestionable, but on the 
other, quite modest. Labor productivity in manufacturing increased by 50 percent from 2005 
through 2008. This sector managed to maintain its share in the GDP, with the added value growth 
in the sector keeping head to head with the overall GDP growth2. The profitability in 
manufacturing sectors grew marginally (from about 16 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2009). 
However, with due regard to the high inflation, this profit margin  can hardly be called impressive. 
An important obstacle to higher manufacturing competitiveness during the boom 
period was a lack of meaningful progress in the institutional environment. During 2005-2009, 
respondents’ assessments of business barriers remained largely unchanged. Fig.1 shows how 
respondents’ perceptions of elements of the business environment as obstacles changed from 
2005 to 20093. Considerable improvements are observed only for tax administration and for 
skilled labor availability ( the latter may be due to the crisis). Moderate improvement may be 
                                                 
1 Detailed description of the dataset can be found  in HSE (2010). 
2 A certain reduction of the manufacturing share in the economy was observed in 2008 as an impact of the crisis 
setting on. 
3 It should be noted that this comparison is not quite accurate because the 2009 survey was conducted at the peak 
of the economic crisis, when growth outlook was uncertain. This may be behind the drastically deteriorated 
perceptions of macroeconomic stability, access to bank credit, and labor regulation 
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seen in assessments of courts and security of doing business. There was no progress in  access 
to infrastructure, though institutional factors continue to be more important constraint for 
business than the state of infrastructure. Interestingly, corruption, so frequently mentioned in 
mass media publications and expert discussions, ranks only eight in the overall ranking of 
business obstacles (mentioned by 21 percent of respondents in 2009). Customs regulation 
seems the most disturbing component, as this issue has moved up from the 15th rank in 2005 
to the 10th in 2009, which can hardly be explained by the economic crisis. Institutional 
constraints are most acute for firms involved in major investment projects, which therefore 
have to deal with the state and regulators more frequently. Thus, businesses making large 
investments in 2005-2008 indicated customs barriers as major business obstacles almost twice 
as frequently as businesses who did not invest during that period (42 percent versus 22 
percent). A similar variance is observed in perceptions of availability of construction permits, 
and access to land is more frequently mentioned as a problem by active investors (35 percent 
of active investors vs 24 percent of investment-free firms). 
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Source: HSE surveys of 2005 and 2009. 
Note: figures on the horizontal axe show the difference between shares of firms that marked a certain problem as 
a serious impediment  for their business/ Minus indicates a downgraded assessment, + an improved one. 
Figure 1. Variation in assessment of business barriers, 2005 and 2009 (percentage points) 
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It is noteworthy that the absence of significant improvements in Russia’s business 
climate against the background  of positive developments in the institutional environment in 
other transition economies weakens competitiveness of Russian enterprises vis-à-vis their 
peers in these economies. According to BEEPS4, Russia in 2002 looked better on average 
than the other 26 surveyed transition economies on three fourths of business climate 
parameters. In 2005, Russia was ahead only on half of the surveyed parameters, while in 2009 
it was behind the average on 16 of the 18 parameters for the other 28 surveyed countries.  
One of the major component of market environment is competition. Low competition 
in Russian manufacturing is traditionally seen as a most important institutional limitation, 
because in the absence of competitive pressures firms have no incentives to improve their 
efficiency. At first sight, the situation did not change in recent years. Both in 2005 and in 
2009 surveys about every fifth enterprise does not face any significant competition either 
from its domestic peers or from any foreign producers. Around 30 percent of firms compete 
exclusively with their domestic rivals, while less than 40 percent of companies are exposed to 
strong competition both from domestic and foreign producers. 
Nevertheless, more detailed analysis reveals considerable changes in the pattern of 
competition from foreign companies. There has been a sizeable increase in the share of 
enterprises reporting considerable competition not with imports but with locally-based foreign 
producers. While in 2005 this type of competition was typical only for two sectors – 
chemicals and textiles&clothing, in 2009 it was faced by increased numbers of domestic 
metals and machine producers (Fig. 2). Thus, to a certain degree, the competition from 
“Russian foreigners” was probably replacing direct competition from imports. 
 
                                                 
4 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is a joint initiative of the EBRD and the World 
Bank, started in 2002. The most recent round of the survey in 2008-2009 covered 11,800 companies in 29 
countries. The survey universe was defined as industrial, commercial or service business establishments with at 
least five full-time employees. The survey used comparable questionnaires. The Russian sample of 2009 
included 1004 enterprises, including 603 industrial companies. The Russian sample of 2005 covered 601 
enterprise. See: The “The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2008-2009 A 
Report on methodology and observations.” October 2009 
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Figure 2. Share of firms facing significant competition from Russia-based foreign producers 
 in 2005 and 2009 (%) 
 
Quality of growth  
Our analysis shows that in general the growth in manufacturing was driven by more 
productive and more competitive firms. This fact can be illustrated by comparing the dynamic 
of three groups of enterprises. Using the performance data for our firms in  2004  we have 
constructed a simple indicator based on firms’ individual labor productivity compared with 
average labor productivity of the industry (type of economic activity) the firm belongs to and 
on the base of top-managers assessments of the competitive position of their firm relative to 
firm’s main competitors. If a firm claims that it is a competitive leader, while its labor 
productivity is above the average sector level, we would classify it to the group of leaders. If a 
firm assesses its competitiveness lower than that of the leaders, while the gap is not closing or 
is widening, and labor productivity is below the average for this type of economic activity, it 
would be classified to the group of outsiders. All the rest of firms would fall within the 
“midrange” group in terms of competitiveness. As we realize the arbitrary and limited 
character of this grouping, we still think it is quite instrumental for drawing a clear line 
between leaders and outsiders. According to the selected criteria, the group of leaders would 
then include about a quarter of surveyed enterprises, the “midrange” group would get about 
55 percent, while the group of outsiders – about 20 percent of the sample. An analysis of 
growth rates in various groups reveals that the bulk of revenue growth falls on more 
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competitive firms. Firms included in the leaders group by the survey of 20055, were 
increasing output by 23 percent per annum on average (in nominal terms) during 2005-2007. 
Another group – with midrange competitiveness – was growing at a rate of 17 percent, while 
the 2005 outsider group was averaging below 10 percent a year. Therefore, the key 
contributors to output growth before the crisis were more competitive businesses with higher 
profitability.  
Output increases in the group of the most competitive firms were accompanied by 
labor productivity advances at similar rates. In other words, these enterprises were increasing 
output basically without any increases in employment, albeit without any significant shedding 
of jobs. The midrange group was improving productivity at higher rates, however, by means 
of labor downsizing. The highest rates of productivity growth were observed in the low 
competitiveness group. A possible explanation for this can be found in two reasons: the low 
base effect and the survival to be included in the 2009 sample of only those outsiders who 
managed to strengthen their resilience, including by efficiency improvements.  
Higher labor productivity growth in less competitive firms set forth an important 
positive trend: narrowing gaps within individual sectors as underperformers manage some 
catching up with the leaders. The variance in labor productivity between the top and the 
bottom quintiles within one economic activity decreased across all sectors over the three years, 
except for chemicals and metals, which may be related in most probability to the favorable global 
environment and exporters’ breaking away ahead from domestically-oriented producers.  
  
 
Technology upgrading and innovations  
Growing demand, access to easy and cheap credit, and sufficient profitability before 
the crisis basically made it possible for most enterprises to embrace the investment-based 
model of economic growth, involving renovation of their fixed assets and technologies. Some 
enterprises made good use of this window of opportunity. Almost 40 percent of enterprises 
were very active in capital investments in the years just before the crisis. However, many of 
them had to face their investment cycles disrupted by the crisis. As a result, Russian 
enterprises continue to lag behind their rivals in technological standards. Self-assessments of 
the technological level of production indicate (Fig. 4) that on average only a fourth of the 
surveyed respondents believe that their technological level is in line with that of their foreign 
                                                 
5 We do not include here the data of 2008, when many industries were severely impacted by the crisis. 
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competitors. Another 30 percent of companies think that their technologies meet the highest 
domestic standards. 
Assuming that the “sound technology performance” watershed lies roughly at the level 
of the Russian best practice, the chemical industry would come out as the top performer. The 
timber and metals sectors have also performed better than the sample average. However, the 
timber industry has also shown a coexistence of firms meeting the most stringent international 
standards and those hopelessly behind, both in high proportion. This may be an evidence of 
extremely high heterogeneity of this sector. The poorest performance has been reported for 
the transport vehicles and machines and equipment engineering.  
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A comparison of the 2005 and 2009 findings shows that the sectors have not come 
closer together in their technology absorption performance. On the opposite, the leaders have 
rather become stronger, while the lagging companies have slipped further behind. In other 
words, most manufacturing industries are ensnared in a trap or a vicious circle of 
backwardness as described in (Polterovich, 2009): innovation cannot drive economic growth, 
as backward production does not create demand for innovation and suppresses supply, while 
absent supply in its way tends to be a drag on demand.  
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The overall innovation performance has not changed visibly: the panel data has 
registered an unchanged number of formal innovators6 (Fig. 5).If we deviate from the formal 
criteria of innovator enterprises and include in this category those which on top of product and 
technology innovations also had some R&D expenditure (essential today at least for 
successful technology adoption and use), it would appear that the share of innovative 
enterprises contracted during 2005-2009. The deepest fall will be then observed in the low-
tech timber and food sectors. 
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Figure 5. Innovation performance metrics in 2005 и 2009, % of total responses 
 
While grouping the companies, we have taken into account not only their use of 
innovation, but also their R&D spending and the specificity of the markets which new 
products target. Analysis shows that  the manufacturing sector is dominated by abstainers (no 
innovation) and imitators, who opt for adopting off-the-shelf solutions. A mere fifth of the 
companies while absorbing innovation have at least the whole domestic market in mind, with 
most of such enterprises concentrated in electronic engineering. Global innovators are most 
numerous in the chemicals sector and are altogether absent from the timber sector.  
Technology underperformance is among the crucial reasons behind low 
competitiveness of Russian industrial firms. Enterprises perceiving themselves in line with the 
national best practice in technology performance and above have productivity 45 percent 
higher than all the other enterprises in the sample. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, proactive 
investment behavior has been raising productivity by 26 percent, while proactive innovation 
                                                 
6 We classify as formal innovators those enterprises that have reported technology innovations over the last three 
year, including a new product offering and/or new technology absorption. We have additionally shown 
enterprises reporting high-tech exports (among exporters) and those who gain competitive advantages via their 
new to market product innovations. 
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behavior (eyeing at least the national market backed by in-house R&D spending) has been 
adding another 15 percent to productivity gains. 
And still, the trends observable prior to the crisis provide good reasons for cautious 
optimism. Unlike in earlier years, when proactive innovation was not always rewarded by 
improvements in competitiveness, the situation was more healthy and market-driven by 2009. 
Innovative enterprises now are really more competitive. Moreover, competitiveness improves 
as innovation goes deeper (Fig.6). 
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Figure 6. Association between firm competitiveness and firm innovation performance 
An assessment of the current trends suggests that an innovative core inside Russia’s 
industry is coming into shape. On the one hand, the proportion of enterprises with non-zero 
R&D investments decreased from 55 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2008. On the other 
hand, the group of enterprises continuing their R&D spending saw a contracted proportion of 
micro-spenders and a respectively increased share of bigger spenders on R&D. 
Ownership and  Corporate governance: from Russian specifics to 
international practice 
Throughout almost the whole transition period, two key features of Russian corporate 
governance have been unanimously noted by researchers. Russia features a very high equity 
concentration ratio, giving rise to tight control of the dominant owner over the corporate 
processes and management bodies, sometimes to the detriment of minority shareholders. Our 
data suggest that the Russian system of corporate governance has been evolving toward 
convergence with systems of most advanced economies. These developments provide for a 
gradual future improvement of corporate governance in Russia.  
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While in 2005 as much as 75 percent of business companies had controlling owners 
(above 50 percent of the company’s stock), in 2009 such companies accounted for 64 percent 
of the sample. Panel data indicate that the proportion of companies having a controlling owner 
has shrunk by more than 6 percentage points for all business companies and by more than 4 
percentage points for joint stock companies.  
This development is observed more as a tendency rather than as a universal 
phenomenon. A panel data analysis shows that each fifth firm has decreased its ownership 
concentration, while each sixth company has increased it. Lower concentration has been a 
result of deliberate measures by dominant owners, as incumbent business owners were more 
frequently reducing the ownership concentration ratio. Increased public offerings and trading 
in company stock and bonds further contributed to the same effect. It should be emphasized 
that stock exchange funding increased during this period, as the share of JSC publicly trading 
in their securities (shares and bonds) doubled over 4 years – from 4.8 percent to 9.6 percent.  
Another important development over the recent years was the trend to transfer control 
from owners to hired managers. According to the data 41 percent of business companies in 
2009 had no major shareholders among their top managers, while their chief executive officer 
had no shares (ownership interest) in the companies under their leadership at all. A 
comparison with data obtained in the course of a 2005 survey (Dolgopaytova, Iwasaki, 
Yakovlev 2009) shows a 10 pp increase (i.e. roughly by a third) of companies engaging hired 
managers in the group of large and medium sized manufacturing JSC. Separation of 
management from ownership creates incentives for large owners to use standard internal 
corporate procedures to oversee the operations of executive management, thus boosting 
demand for corporate governance rules and procedures on behalf of business.  
Probably, the most important trend is a wider participation of foreign owners 
(investors) in the equity of Russian manufacturing firms. In early 2000s, empirical studies 
identified 1-2 percent of foreign interest in manufacturing. The 2005 survey mentioned above 
found out that on average foreign investors accounted for up to 4 percent of equity in 
manufacturing, while JSC with foreign participation accounted for less than 10 percent.  
Foreign equity participation is reported by each 10th business company in the 2009 
sample, while more than half of them have controlling foreign owners with a stake over 50 
percent. Though the total share of foreign investors in the sample is not very high (especially 
in contrast to other countries) averaging 6 percent of the total equity, foreign owners in Russia 
tend to have rather large stakes. In companies with foreign co-owners their interest would be 
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exceeding 60 percent. Besides Foreign investors tend to hold bigger stakes in companies 
employing above 1000 people.  
The trend for increased foreign ownership of companies was across-the-board, with no 
visible signs of concentration in individual sectors, but more prominent in the chemical 
industry, manufacturing of transport vehicles and equipment, and in the metals sector. 
 Economists and policy-makers have long been heatedly debating the impact of 
ownership structure on business operations and of the role of foreign ownership in particular. 
In Russia, it has always been especially difficult to pinpoint and dissect the ownership factor 
from many others, not in the least because of low transparency of ownership structures. This 
is why empirical studies (not very numerous) would generate differing, sometimes conflicting 
results. 
Our study suggests that firm behavior and business competitiveness have developed 
more close links to the structure of equity capital. Specifically, there has emerged an explicit 
positive correlation with foreign co-ownership, earlier observed both in advanced and 
transition economies. 
Foreign participation boosts vigorous modernization behavior of enterprises (Fig. 7), 
promoting comprehensive development of business and alignment of strategic and day-to-day 
managerial objectives. Enterprises with foreign ownership are seeking market leadership (43 
percent of those), as they are more inclined to strategic behavior and more active in 
investments. These enterprises are looking for strategic partnerships, first of all, 
internationally. Strategic targets are based on benchmarking with foreign competitors and 
significantly more frequent leveraging of other management technologies, business 
restructuring measures and measures to enhance accounting and reporting. 
Opposite to sometimes mentioned thethis that foreign owners are not interested in 
innovative development of their Russian assets, our study shows that it is not quite so. Firms 
with foreign interest demonstrate a more proactive innovation behavior. Over 60 percent of 
them offered new products, while over 50 percent developed new technologies. As a result, 
firms with foreign participation include 50 percent more innovative firms. However, we 
should make a reservation on this point that it may be due to the positive selection effect, i.e. 
because foreign investors initially tend to cherry-pick more efficient enterprises for their 
participation.  
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Figure 7. Behavior profile of companies with foreign equity 
 
It should be also noted that our survey does not support a general understanding that 
foreigners come to Russia exclusively to tap the domestic market: almost 89 percent of 
enterprises with foreign equity are exporters, notably, not only in resource-intensive sectors. 
These enterprises have exports shares in their sales 4 times exceeding those for enterprises 
without foreign equity with higher share of export going to non-CIS countries (39 percent of 
their exports to non-CIS vs 21 percent of non-CIS exports for other enterprises).  
Quality of management: sound management is essential for 
competitiveness  
For many years, poor management of Russian enterprises associated with inadequate 
management skills has been seen as a key weakness of the Russian economy, in spite of the 
fact that it were management innovations that drove firm efficiency in the first half of the 
2000s. Our earlier study (Golikova et al. 2007) found out that by 2004-2005 the quality of 
management at Russian manufacturing enterprises was highly varied. Some enterprises were 
leveraging a wide array of state-of-the-art management technologies and engaging MBA 
graduates, while others did not use even the most elementary modern production management 
methods. 
An empirical survey may assess the quality of management by the number of 
management technologies employed . Generally, the higher the number,  the better would be 
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the management. Distribution of enterprises into three groups7 shows that about a third falls 
into a group with underdeveloped management, about a half performs at a mid-range level, 
while a fifth has management above the average. It is noteworthy that a long tail of poor 
performers in management is quite characteristic for other BRIC countries (e.g. for Brazil and 
India) and is not specifically limited to Russia (Bloom & Reenen, 2010).  
Despite the limitations of the indicator used to measure the quality of management, 
many determinants identified at Russian enterprises are surprisingly similar to those 
discovered by cross-country surveys. Thus, the quality of management appears significantly 
better in larger enterprises, in foreign-owned companies and in exporters. (Fig. 9). In the 
Russian context, a better performance is also seen in companies, which make part of 
integrated business groups, and in firms established in 1992-1998. The Russian picture differs 
from other countries as evidenced by similar surveys in that there is no satisfactory evidence 
of poorer management in government-owned enterprises. Nor do we have any evidence of 
better management of enterprises headed by hired CEOs versus owners.  
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Figure 9. Quality of management across groups of enterprises in 2009, % 
 
The quality of management is an important contributor to firm competitiveness. Other 
variables constant, firms with management performance “above average” tend to become 
leaders 5+ times more frequently than firms with management performance “below average”.  
Competitiveness leadership is most related to such management technologies as 
branding and ISO certification. A significant association between competitiveness and 
                                                 
7 The highest possible number of management technologies assessed in the survey is 14, the sample average is 
4.12, and the median is 4. We have classified the surveyed enterprises into three groups by their management 
performance: “considerably lower than average” (0-2 technologies utilized); «average» (3-5 management 
instruments); and «above average» (6 and more).  
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branding is a new development, not observed by the survey of 2005. The value of trademarks 
and brands was growing in recent years, as evidenced by the fact that branding was adopted by a 
quarter of the enterprises in the panel, which had not been involved in this activity before 2005. 
A separate mention is deserved by the progress achieved in ISO certification. By now 
half of the industrial enterprises have been certified – 11.2 percentage points more than in 
2005 (growth by 8.1 percent for the panel).. This is especially the case for larger enterprises, 
with two thirds of certified enterprises in the group employing 500-1000 people, and above 80 
percent of companies in the group of companies employing above 1000. 
A recent observable development is the use of management innovations not instead but 
along with major investments and technological innovation. This suggests that innovation in a 
broad sense as it is seen internationally may be applicable to some enterprises, i.e. innovation 
in business models, products and processes. The share of enterprises leveraging various 
management technologies is 1.5-2.5 times larger in the group of innovative and investment 
proactive enterprises (see Fig. 10). As a result, each third enterprise in this group 
demonstrates management better than average, while in the group of non-innovative and non-
investing (or investing on a small scale) enterprises it would be only every tenth. 
Still another positive development in management is the longer planning horizon. The 
findings show that 2005-2009 saw a sizeable contraction (by 15 percentage points) of the 
proportion of enterprises unable to project beyond one year. Now more than half of the 
companies, despite the crisis, confidently plan for 1 – 3 years ahead.This trend is fully 
observable with panel data as well. Half of the firms that back in 2005 indicated a planning 
horizon under a year, in 2009 claimed they could plan for 1-3 years ahead, while 15 percent of 
them said they could plan for more than three years. Generally, a longer planning horizon is 
typical for enterprises in holding groups, for enterprises employing over 500 people and also 
for companies geared toward innovation or imitation. The longer is the planning horizon, the 
more often enterprises tend to practice systemic improvements of management and major 
investments. 
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by innovation and investment activity, % 
During the period from 2005 to 2009 management skills improved significantly. The 
number of firms employing MBA graduates of Russian business schools and universities 
doubled from 9 percent to 17 percent in the panel. Every seventh enterprise in 2009 included 
managers with a history of employment by a foreign firm.. Companies looking toward 
innovation leadership would invest not only in technology renovation, but also in human 
resources, trying to engage highly qualified and experienced managers. This group averages a 
twice as big proportion of MBA graduates of Russian schools, holders of international 
advanced degrees in economics and management and a history of employment by a foreign 
company, than the overall survey, and three times as big than in the group of innovation and 
investment abstainers.  
Therefore, the Russian industry has developed a cluster of enterprises with top quality 
management staff employing a total range of the latest management technologies. This 
enclave is not vast, just about 15 percent, and it has not yet become dominant in determining 
the overall quality of management in Russia’s manufacturing. According to the 2009 data, 
almost 45 percent of firms are doing quite well in their markets without innovation and major 
investment, as they only sluggishly undertake some management improvements.  
The biggest challenges as regards management enhancement in Russian enterprises 
relate to launching regular benchmarking – comparisons with foreign and Russian 
competitors, and also to diagnostics and restructuring of business processes. Even within the 
group of innovative and investment proactive enterprises only a third practice benchmarking, 
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while only half of them diagnose and restructure business processes. Meanwhile, a recent  
study (McKinsey, 2009) underscored weak business processes as the key driver of low 
productivity of Russian enterprises compared to benchmark countries.  
 
The Labor Market: is manufacturing facing skills shortages  
Throughout the 1990s, redundant labor persisted as the key labor-related problem 
faced by enterprises. It means enterprises had excess employees increasing their costs. In the 
2000s, especially in the second half of the decade, enterprises were increasingly complaining 
about labor deficit, though complaints about surplus labor also persisted. Earlier studies 
(Gimpelson et al, 2008) revealed that less efficient enterprises are more likely to report labor 
deficit as regards skilled labor. We argued that labor deficit complaints were rather caused by 
low efficiency and inability to pay competitive wages than by the actual lack of skilled 
workforce in the labor market.  
The survey of 2009 offers a different macroeconomic context for an assessment of labor 
excess and deficit issues, i.e. a raging crisis and deep recession instead of rapid growth followed 
by overheating economy and increased demand for labor. Responses indicate that the labor 
shortage was resolved, albeit may be temporarily. While in 2005 about 60 percent of enterprises 
perceived their staffing level optimal, in the spring of 2009 when the survey was conducted this 
share exceeded 70 percent. At the same time, the share of understaffed enterprises halved (from 
27 percent to 13 percent), whereas the proportion of excessively staffed firms remained 
unchanged (edged down to 12 percent from the earlier 13 percent). In other words, the economic 
crisis,  has dramatically reduced demand for labor and accelerated decline in employment and  has 
demonstrated that the Russian manufacturing sector is rather dominated by the problem of excess 
employment. The fact of this switchover from deficit to surplus is further supported by other 
surveys of large and medium-sized enterprises (IET, 2010). 
In a crisis environment, it will be first of all successful companies that can maintain 
optimal staffing. For enterprises that assess their financial and economic position as sound, 
the magnitude of suboptimal employment (as a quantifying measure of variation from the 
norm), even if they report it, would be much lower. It does not exceed 10 percent of payroll 
headcount, while in the group of weak financial and economic performers the shortage would 
be 15 percent on average (if they have a shortage, of course), while the surplus would be 
above 22 percent. 
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However, structural deficit, specifically, skilled labor deficit, arguably does have some 
reality behind it in manufacturing. It is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that even during 
the crisis skilled labor shortages are reported by over 36 percent of enterprises. Yet, compared 
to the 2005 survey, when this problem was reported by over half of the respondents, the 
improvement appears visible. 
Summing up, labor shortage complaints have become much less frequent (though their 
occurrence is non-zero) than in 2005, while labor excess complaints occur relatively more 
frequently (though they have not become across-the-board despite the crisis). Many 
enterprises report both at the same time, though for varying occupational groups. During the 
downturn, as well as during the boom, the key contributor to labor shortages continues to be 
relatively inadequate compensation, rather than the physical deficit of workforce in the labor 
market. As for the structural deficit of certain staff categories, we believe it is rooted in the 
underdeveloped system of vocational and professional training, especially in-house training, 
rather than in their physical shortage. 
Formally, staff training has been reported by every second industrial enterprise in our 
survey8, which may be considered reasonably high performance (though in 2005 this 
proportion was 69 percent). However, the key issue here is that the overwhelming number of 
enterprises pursue their training programs on a very small scale. This refers both to their 
coverage and duration. Indeed, only every fifth enterprise has training programs covering over 
10 percent of employees, while only 15 percent has programs lasting for over a month. 
Still another specific feature of the Russian labor market that may be driving deficits, 
including structural deficits, is its flexibility. Russian labor market flexibility primarily comes 
from the low share of the basic rate (fixed part of labor compensation) in total labor costs. On 
the one hand, this feature allows enterprises to promptly respond and adapt to any changes in 
the market and manage costs. On the other hand, it encourages high labor turnover, because 
employees tend to be predominately motivated by the current wage level. In its turn, high 
turnover creates disincentives for enterprises to invest in training and retraining. 
Employment flexibility in Russia is vividly illustrated by firm response to the crisis, 
when about two thirds of enterprises had to adapt their employment and labor compensation 
to the changed situation. Notwithstanding sweeping changes in the overall Russian labor 
market conditions (institutional, structural and macroeconomic) in the 2000s, enterprises still 
use all the instruments and methods of crisis adaptation that date back to the 1990s. When 
faced with major economic difficulties, enterprises, like in the past, opt to take several routes 
                                                 
8 Training and professional development data refer to 2008, when most of the year was non-crisis. 
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simultaneously. They would cut their headcount, shorten working hours, stop paying benefits, 
reduce wages and salaries, and even may run arrears if the worst comes to the worst. The 
three key instruments – lay-offs, shorter working hours and salary cuts - were utilized almost 
in equal proportion with a minor bias toward shorter working hours. During the crisis, about 
41 percent of surveyed enterprises resorted to headcount cuts, 46 percent opted for shorter 
working hours or administrative leave, while 39 percent reduced wages.  
Is this kind of flexibility a competitive advantage or on the contrary a weakness of the 
Russian labor market paradigm? The answer to this question will largely depend on what sort 
of crisis we are responding and adjusting to. If we assume a short-term crisis caused by price 
volatility, which does not require a profound transformation of the economy’s structure, then, 
apparently, such “uncivilized” measures as shorter working hours, unpaid leaves and salary 
cuts really help to cushion the shocks of the crisis and to support social stability. However, if 
we interpret the crisis as a signal that the economy structure is inefficient, in need of an 
overhaul, and, consequently, as a lingering crisis, then such instruments would rather mask 
real problems and prevent labor from shifting to more efficient sectors and more efficient 
enterprises, thus impeding recovery. 
A new role of regional and local authorities 
The experience of China, Brazil, Mexico and some other developing countries suggest 
that local and regional authorities may help firms to attract investment, to modernize and get 
access to international markets. Our study confirmed similar trends in Russia in 2007-2008. 
Our review of business-government relations included several aspects: federal, 
regional or local fiscal support received by enterprises in 2007-2008, administrative support 
provided by government authorities of various levels during the same period9, and regional 
social development support to regional and/or local authorities provided by enterprises in 
2007-2008. 
The data indicate (Fig. 11) that in 2007-2008, regional authorities were the most active 
providers of support. In total, 26 percent of firms in the survey received support from this 
government level, including 19 percent receiving administrative support and 14 percent 
financial support. It may be also noteworthy that the regional and local levels provided 
administrative support more frequently, while the federal level focused on financial support. 
                                                 
9 Administrative support was interpreted as any other than financial support, including assistance in contacts 
with Russian and foreign partners, other government authorities, in attracting investors, etc.  
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An important aspect of business-government relationships is support provided by 
businesses to regional and municipal authorities in social development of the region. This 
practice is almost universal. In 2007-2008, only 23 percent of firms did not provide any 
assistance to the authorities (Fig. 12). However, it would be fair to say that most enterprises 
did not incur burdensome costs while assisting the authorities.  
This “socially responsible” behavior was often rewarded. Indeed, in the group of 
socially responsible companies 27-34 percent of respondents reported receiving some kind of 
regional government support, versus only 12 percent in the group of businesses that did not 
spend on social development of their regions. 
Apart from business support to the region, other factors could influence government 
support. Those may be classified to three groups: structural features of enterprises, indicators 
of their social responsibility performance and of their modernization performance. 
Structural features included the enterprise’s sector, its size, its age (when it was 
established), specific owners (the government, foreign investors), and the investment potential 
of the host region. To measure the social responsibility of enterprises, alongside the above 
mentioned support to local and regional authorities in regional social development, we also 
took into account respondents’ job preservation and/or creation and their participation in 
business associations. Employment support (via job preservation and/or creation) may be an 
element in the business-government interchange. In their turn, business associations are one 
of the channels for enterprises to communicate with the public authorities. Modernization 
performance was measured via export performance, occurrence of major investments in 2005-
2008 and innovation performance. 
 
Figure 11. Share of enterprises receiving government financial and organizational support in 2007 
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Figure 12. Business support to local and regional authorities in regional social development 
 
The analysis indicates that government support is more often provided to firms located 
in regions with low and medium investment potential. Another common feature is as follows: 
in all the cases the old firms dating back to the Soviet times have apparent preferences in 
getting access to government support.   
Government support at the federal level may be different from the other levels in that 
only at the federal level government-owned firms get explicit preference. At the same time, 
federal support focuses on firms that preserve jobs. However, modernization variables tend to 
prove non-significant. This combination suggests a sort of a “conservative exchange”, when 
the federal government issues support to older enterprises and companies with government 
stakes, while in exchange it expects the recipient companies to sustain their employment 
headcount.  
The regional and local levels present a largely modified set of factors associated with 
access to government incentives. An important predictor is support to the authorities in 
regional social development. This may be seen as a symptom signaling the existence of 
“exchange arrangement”. Another significant factor for getting support from government 
authorities is firm participation in business associations, confirming the role of associations as 
a business-to-government communication channel. Contrary to expectation, neither job 
preservation nor government stakes are associated with access to the regional and municipal 
incentives. 
Unlike federal support, getting regional and municipal support is conditional on some 
aspects of firm modernization performance. Thus, regional authorities in 2005-2008 
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conditioned their support on whether the enterprise engaged in major investment projects. 
Municipal support in 2007-2008 was much more frequently provided to firms with foreign 
equity. However, it’s still an open question whether regional and local authorities support 
companies that invest, or these companies are developing and investing thanks to the 
government support?  
Due to the nature of our study we could survey only “insiders”, i.e. the companies that 
have already entered the regional market and developed relations with the authorities. 
Therefore they can feel relatively comfortable compared to outsiders, who have not yet 
entered the market. This “insider alliance” theory may be further supported by the evidence 
revealed in the course of the study that enterprises established before 1991 get priority in 
access to support at any level of government. However, preferences granted to firms with 
foreign equity run counter to this assumption, suggesting at least co-existence of a variety of 
criteria that may determine granting regional and municipal government support. 
Conclusion: will the crisis become a moment of truth for the Russian 
industry? 
Before the crisis, as we tried to show with reference to some cases, Russia’s 
manufacturing was undergoing strong structural transformation, followed by enterprise 
behavior changes. These processes had a direct impact on firm efficiency and 
competitiveness. Certainly, a detailed study of the changes and their underlying causes 
requires further profound analysis. However, the general development trends seem quite 
obvious. 
The development was based on optimized utilization of available resources within the 
bounds of existing company markets and largely inside the entrenched basic technologies. 
This conclusion is supported both by the stable structure of product markets  and by low 
innovation and investment performance, accompanied by a persisting technology gap vis-à-
vis international rivals. It may be said with some stretching that Russian enterprises generally 
continued manufacturing the same products using the same production capacities and 
technologies, while selling them to the same buyers..  
While the public and experts were debating pros and contras of the catch up type of 
development, and the government urged for an innovative break-through, most enterprises 
seemed to bet on the catch-up strategy, based on absorption and implementation of the 
existing (mostly foreign) technologies and equipment, and small-scale and imitating 
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innovations. While the economy was growing, this strategy proved successful for many 
enterprises, albeit only for those who started pursuing it several years before the crisis.  
Still, the pre-crisis period was the period of “positive selection”: more efficient 
competitive enterprises were growing faster than those less competitive. The latter (those who 
survived) were catching up with the leaders, contributing to some closing of efficiency gaps 
within the sector. The economic crisis of 2008-2009 disrupted the smooth evolution of 
Russia’s industry, as it dramatically changed the environment for development and generated 
new challenges and threats. In the spring of 2009, when the survey was conducted, more than 
half of the enterprises indicated lower demand for their products as a severe problem, while 
40 percent faced the need to adjust employment and/or wages (via various forms of shorter 
working time and compensation reductions). Still another 40 percent declared axing their 
investment projects and programs.  At the same time, an unexpected finding was that many 
firms intended to try new market entry as a crisis response measure. This intention was 
reported by 40 percent of respondents, dominated by more competitive enterprises. About a 
third of companies were planning major investments during the next 12 months, despite the 
crisis. 
Such intentions indicate that the crisis could lead to market redistribution in favor of 
more efficient enterprises and create incentives for broadening one’s market and leveraging 
investment to enhance production effic iency. Admittedly, however, it would be more difficult 
in the post-crisis world even for Russia’s manufacturing leaders to move from the defensive 
strategy (defending one’s entrenched positions in existing markets) to an offensive break-
through into new markets or new product markets. We can hardly expect in the near future to 
get the same favorable conditions, i.e. cheap credit and galloping demand, as we saw in the 
years leading up to the crisis. 
This may be the reason, as we see it, why many manufacturing enterprises have again 
found themselves at the cross-roads, facing a dilemma: should they revert to the earlier 
strategy of gradual evolutionary improvements aimed at catching up with competitors 
shooting ahead, or should they try and leverage the crisis to challenge their rivals and pressure 
them out both in the domestic market and in global markets? The way this dilemma is 
resolved will largely depend on government policies. 
This is not an easy trade-off. Given the difficult situation many enterprises find 
themselves in, a wish to help and to protect is only too natural. Moreover, it is supported by 
the expectations of the business community. Thus, every second respondent in our survey 
spoke for a freeze on natural monopoly tariffs, while larger government procurement and 
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import restrictions got 20 percent of votes each. Only tax reductions, banking system support 
and support to the ruble exchange rate are more popular with enterprise top managers than the 
above measures. 
So far policy-makers have been staking on the “national champions”. However, our 
data suggest that “runners up” are more resilient and have a higher capacity for relatively low-
cost growth. In our survey (which is generally biased toward medium-sized enterprises) these 
would be companies employing 500 and above people. Providing support to such firms poses 
fewer risks of government failure. As such firms are numerous, risks of supporting inefficient 
firms are neutralized. And still, appropriate channels and appropriately designed support 
instruments are essential.  
In defiance of the entrenched stereotypes, the manufacturing sector has accumulated 
potential capable of driving economic growth. Today, it depends on the government and its 
willingness to interact with business how much of this potential will be tapped to drive 
development in Russia. 
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